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The Unrealities of Time 
 
BAPTISTE LE BIHAN University of Rennes 1 
 
ABSTRACT: Is time flowing? A-theorists say ‘yes’, B-theorists say ‘no’. But both take 
time to be real, which means that B-theorists accept that time is real, even if lacking 
a property usually ascribed to it. In this paper, I ask what the different properties 
usually ascribed to time there are in order to draw the list of different possible kinds 
of realism and anti-realism about time. As we will see, there are three main kinds of 
anti-realism. I will argue that if time is defined as the universe's fourth dimension, 
there is no way time could be unreal.  
 
RÉSUMÉ : Le temps s’écoule-t-il? Les théoriciens A répondent positivement, les 
théoriciens B négativement. Les deux camps s’accordent cependant sur la réalité du 
temps. Cela signifie que les théoriciens B acceptent la réalité du temps en dépit du 
rejet d’une propriété qui lui est communément attribuée. Dans cet article, je veux 
examiner les différentes propriétés qui sont généralement attribuées au temps afin 
de faire la liste des différents types de réalisme et d’anti-réalisme. Nous le verrons, il 
existe trois types d’anti-réalisme. Je soutiendrai que si l’on définit le temps comme la 
quatrième dimension de l’univers, l’irréalité du temps est exclue. 
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1. Introduction 
 
These days, one can hear some physicists claiming that time is or might be unreal. 
But it is difficult to understand what exactly is supposed to be unreal, since there is 
no consensus about what time is supposed to be. In this paper, I offer a clarification 
of different possible kinds of anti-realism about time in order to understand these 
anti-realist claims. I should emphasize that this work involves conceptual analysis, 
not philosophy of physics. Hence, I will not claim to fully understand the models on 
which physicists are working. My aim is more modest: in offering clarifications of the 
concept of time, I hope to make clear what different options are on the table with 
respect to the (un)reality of time. Let us start by quoting some claims. For instance1, 
Julian Barbour writes: 
 
I believe in a timeless universe for the childlike reason that time cannot be seen—
the emperor has no clothes. I believe that the universe is static …2.  
 
                                                
1 See also Witten (2001, 125). 
2 Barbour (1999, 251). 
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Or to take another example, Carlo Rovelli writes: 
 
Einstein's discovery is that newtonian spacetime and the gravitational field are the 
same entity. This can be expressed in two equivalent ways. One states that there 
is no spacetime; there is only the gravitational field. This is the choice I have made 
in this book3.  
 
 To be sure, Rovelli and Barbour are not endorsing the same view. But what 
they share is the idea that time is unreal. Once again, I am not a physicist and I will 
not pretend to fully understand how the world would look like if Rovelli's or Barbour's 
views describe adequately the actual world. However, I believe there is an 
overstatement in the idea that time is unreal and that some conceptual analysis 
might help understand what exactly comes under attack with such anti-realist claims. 
I believe that the idea that time is unreal is not only counter-intuitive, but more 
problematically, incompatible with what we know about the universe in which we live. 
I hope that at the end of the day I will have convinced you that, even in the more 
anti-realist account about time, there is still something 'temporal' in the world, at least 
in a minimal way, and that physicists cannot deny reality to time, but only to 
particular properties of time. 
 Before pursuing, it is important to say a few words about fundamentality. 
Physicists and philosophers of physics sometimes say that there is no time at the 
fundamental level of reality4. This idea of fundamentality might correspond to two 
things. Either there is a genuine fundamentality because the world is layered in a 
plurality of levels, or this is only a way of speaking. I believe that most of these 
physicists mean this fundamentality to be only a way of speaking. Hence, the idea 
that there is no time at the fundamental level of reality would only mean that, 
properly speaking, there is no time at all. 
 But alternatively, some might believe that time is a sort of emergent property 
or phenomenon. This relation of emergence carries the idea of a robust relation 
between distinct properties or phenomenon. Time would be real at some less basic 
level, and unreal at some fundamental level. The idea of a stratified ontology with 
some level connected to another level by ontological connections is not specific to 
philosophical matters about time (or spacetime). Let us remember debates on the 
relation between mental and physical properties, or between normative properties 
and natural ones. Are aesthetics properties of a landscape supervening on natural 
properties of that landscape? Are they grounded in it? Are they emergent properties? 
Is this relation an instance of an ontological primitive? Or, on the contrary, are we 
just dealing with a relation of identity between two descriptions of one and only one 
entity? Hence, the idea of a fundamental level is not proper to philosophy of time, to 
say the least. 
 However, let us just notice that in the case of time, local supervenience is 
unavailable. Indeed, for any entity x that could be said to supervene on any entity y, 
x and y have to exist at the same place at the same time. Then, claiming that time 
locally supervenes on a physical situation generates a vicious circle. It would mean 
that time supervenes on a physical situation at some place and at some time. Then, 
if time supervenes on the non-temporal realm, it does so with a relation of global 
supervenience: the whole time (or spacetime) supervenes on the whole non-
temporal (or non-spatio-temporal) realm. It means that, for two possible worlds w1 
                                                
3 Rovelli (2004, 77). 
4 See for instance Monton (2009). 
3 
 
and w2, if w1 and w2 are physically indiscernible with respect to their non-temporal 
(or non-spatio-temporal) properties, they are also indiscernible with respect to their 
temporal (or spatio-temporal) properties. 
 One possible problem for that supervenience relation is that it doesn’t explain 
anything. It describes co-variance between sets of properties, without telling us why 
there is such a co-variance. The co-variance could follow from the identity of the two 
sets of properties. But, as we know, it could be the result of a more robust 
ontological relation as grounding or realization. From a dialectical point of view, the 
supervenience relation is very interesting: issues associated with it would also be 
issues for any ontological relation covered up by the broad category of 
supervenience. While I do not have a knock-down argument against the idea of 
emergence, this idea implies a weird ontological relation between a fundamental 
non-spatio-temporal realm and time properties. Following this idea implies having a 
primitive ontological relation of fundamentality and accepting a stratified ontology. 
Nevertheless, in what follows I will focus on the reality of time independently of the 
indexation of time to a particular level of reality. I believe that all of what I will say is 
compatible with both a layered and a flat ontology.  
 Why exactly are these physicists claiming that time is unreal? Probably 
because the variable t classically associated with time cannot be found in some 
mathematical equations. Hence, they conclude that time is unreal. I take this move to 
be too radical. As I will try to show, the variable t is not the only thing that points 
towards the existence of time. A better strategy would be to assume that time is real, 
and that we must find out what it is. This is not to say that one should not be 
skeptical about the existence of some alleged properties of time. As I will argue, 
there are different kinds of realism/anti-realism about time, according to the property 
of time considered. Hence, in order to understand the various realist and anti-realist 
claims available, we must look first at the concept of time. To start, I will describe 
McTaggart’s famous kind of anti-realism and the discussion it launched between A- 
and B-theorists5.  
 
2. A First Unreality 
 
Let us start with a famous debate over the existence of a flow of time. According to 
the A-theory, things really are passing in time independently of our perceptions, by 
the dynamic power of A-properties: properties of being past, present and future6. 
Things are first future, then they are present and after that, they become past. This 
implies an ontological distinction between past, present and future. The property of 
being present would be moving in spacetime by applying successively to different 
slices of this spacetime. An object is present if it is located in the only slice that owns 
the transitory property of being present. On the opposite, B-theorists about time do 
                                                
5 Brian Monton (2009) aims at using McTaggart's claim that time is unreal to 
interpret physicists’ claims that time is unreal. His aim is the same as mine: to make 
clear what it can mean that time is unreal. I take my account to be a contribution 
towards this goal. However, while Monton uses McTaggart's conceptual tools to 
describe different physical views (special relativity, general relativity, quantum 
mechanics and quantum gravity), my own goal is more conceptual. I want to make 
clear what the different options are for counting a physical or a metaphysical theory 
as being anti-realist about time. 
6 For a defense of the view, see for instance Markosian (1993) and Zimmerman 
(2008). 
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not believe in the reality of such transitory A-properties. According to them7, A-
properties are unreal and the actual world is only made of B-relations. And, they 
claim that B-relations are enough to characterize the actual world as being genuinely 
temporal. 
 This distinction between A-series and B-series is due to McTaggart8, 
according to whom the two ways of organizing events (with A-properties and B-
relations) leads to a contradiction. Events are supposed to be both past, present and 
future because the A-classification can be done from every location in the network of 
B-relations. But, of course, A-properties are mutually incompatible: an event cannot 
be, say, both past and future. Hence, events have and cannot have different A-
properties. But this is not the end of the story. The point is that, if one wants to avoid 
the contradiction, one must relativize properties to times: for instance, an event is 
past with respect to t, and is future with respect to t1. But then, the resulting 
properties being past-with-respect-to-t and being future-with-respect-to-t1 will lead to 
a new contradiction of second order that will only be avoided by making appeal to 
new properties of third order, relativized once again to times. And so it goes infinitely. 
Usually, this sort of infinite regress in explanation is taken to be vicious. Why exactly 
it is so is a delicate matter. But obviously this kind of explanation, if not contradictory, 
properly speaking, is at least defective with regard to theoretical economy, since we 
end up with an infinite chain of justification. In any case, McTaggart concludes that 
there are no such things as these A-properties. And, because he takes these A-
properties to be essential to the reality of time, he endorses the view that time is 
unreal. More precisely, he takes A-properties to be essential to the reality of genuine 
change, and takes genuine change to be essential to the reality of time. By 
transitivity of the relation of essentiality, he takes A-properties to be essential to time. 
Here I do not discuss the relevance of the argument, since my aim is to classify the 
different kinds of anti-realism, not to assess them.  
 Now I would ask: what is the genuine difference between McTaggart's 
deflationary conception of time and the B-theory? Following Mellor, I take the 
difference to be merely terminological. As he writes: 
 
McTaggart argued … that there is in reality no such thing as time. … [In] 
McTaggart's sense it is still made by those who think that time is merely one of the 
four dimensions of an unchanging 'block universe'. 
 
[McTaggart] admits of course that there is a fourth dimension of what we call 
spacetime, a dimension which we mistake for time. But as he thinks variation in 
this dimension no more entails change in his sense than spatial variation does, he 
declines to call it time. That is what he means by saying that time is unreal9.  
 
 According to Mellor, McTaggart and the block universe theorists (that is, in 
this context, the B-theorists) agree on the existence of a fourth dimension. They 
differ only about a mainly verbal matter: should we entitle ourselves to call this fourth 
dimension ‘time’? McTaggart says ‘no’ because he takes the passage of time to be 
an essential aspect of the concept of time. The B-theorists say ‘yes’ along a 
revisionary conception of time: time is real, but it differs substantially from the pre-
                                                
7 See for instance Smart (1963), Mellor (1998, 2001), Oaklander (2013). 
8 McTaggart (1908). 
9 Mellor (2001, 45, 47). 
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theoretical concept. Here I fully agree with Mellor: I fail to see where the difference 
really lies between a B-world and McTaggart's world10. Both worlds are structured by 
four dimensions, and what we call time is a space-like dimension. According to the 
B-theorist, this space-like dimension can be called ‘time,’ while for McTaggart, it 
cannot. Hence, from now on I will take for granted that the B-theory is a genuine first 
candidate for being a kind of anti-realism about time. 
 The B-theory is anti-realist about time if and only if a particular property of the 
concept of time (that it flows) is essential to it. And as I already said, this essentiality 
is a verbal matter. Obviously, it is not because the matter is verbal that this is not a 
genuine problem. Indeed, one could ask how many properties of the concept of time 
must be denied reality before concluding that time is unreal. But this is not the 
problem I address in this paper. Instead, what I will do is examine how many time 
properties there are, and hence, how many anti-realist conceptions of time can be 
endorsed. Let us list these different properties. 
 
3. Time’s Properties 
 
We have just seen that flow is a first property of time about which we can be 
skeptical. What remains then from the concept of time when it is stripped out from its 
A-properties? Obviously, we are left with B-relations, relations of before-after. This is 
a first way to understand the point. But it already takes for granted that the concept 
of B-relations is a primitive one, one that cannot be analyzed in something else. 
According to McTaggart, however, the concept of B-relations is not primitive. B-
relations result from the transition of A-properties within C-series11. Or, to put it 
differently, the time dimension owns its direction thanks to the direction of the flow of 
time. It is not perfectly clear what conception of C-relations McTaggart used12. Here, 
I do not explore this historical point; I will take C-relations to be order relations having 
no intrinsic direction without saying anything more about them. A C-relation looks like 
a B-relation, except that it lacks an intrinsic direction. 
 It must be said that there is another possible way to construe the connections 
between A, B and C-series. According to Russell13, time is wholly made up of B-
relations, meaning that both A-properties and C-relations are unreal. He is well-
known to endorse the view that B-relations are intrinsically and primitively directed, 
without any need to refer to A-properties. Basically, the idea is that one can both 
admit B-relations and deny reality to C-relations and A-properties, in construing 
directionality to be embedded in B-relations. Following Oaklander14, one can choose 
to call these relations 'R-relations', reserving the name 'B-relations' for entities 
resulting of the application of A-properties to C-relations. Conflating B-relations and 
R-relations has no importance for my current purpose. It only means that one can be 
both realist about B-series and anti-realist about A-series and C-series because 
dimensionality is intrinsic to B-series. Hence, Russell’s and, more recently, 
Oaklander's views are kinds of anti-realism about the flow, but are realists about both 
                                                
10 At least regarding the flow of time. We will see that some B-theories depart 
from McTaggart's view under other aspects. 
11 Or more exactly, B-relations would result from the transition of A-properties in 
C-series, if time was real. McTaggart's aim is precisely to show that a contradiction 
follows from the alleged existence of A-properties. 
12 According to McDaniel (2013), one could interpret this relation as either a 
primitive relation or an adequacy relation.  
13 Russell (1938, 95-96, originally published in 1903). 
14 Oaklander (2013). 
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directionality and dimensionality. Hence, in what follows, I will not specifically discuss 
Russell's view15. From now on, by ‘B-relations,’ I will mean either primitively directed 
B-relations (R-relations), or derivatively directed B-relations (resulting from the 
application of A-properties to C-relations). 
 We just had a grip on new properties of the concept of time: directionality and 
dimensionality. Let us put it differently. First, time is supposed to flow (A-properties). 
Second, it is supposed to have a direction (engaging the reality of B-relations). 
Finally, it is supposed to have a dimensionality (engaging the reality of C-relations). I 
take these three properties (flow, direction and dimensionality) to be at the heart of 
our questions about time. Importantly, they allow us to construe different kinds of 
anti-realism about time. If there are three distinct properties of the concept of time, 
correspondingly there are three conceivable kinds of anti-realism about time. We 
already saw the famous B-theory, a view that can be understood as a kind of anti-
realism if one takes transitory A-properties to be essential to time16. Let us define the 
last two kinds of anti-realism as the C-theory and the D-theory. The C-theory denies 
reality not only to the flow of time, but also to the direction of time. Hence, the C-
theory is a kind of anti-realism if and only if directionality is an essential aspect of 
time. On the other hand, the C-theory is a kind of realism about time if and only if 
directionality is not essential to time. The D-theory is far more radical in that it denies 
reality to the time dimension. I will address this view later in the paper. 
 In the same way one could argue that the B-theory of time is not a kind of anti-
realism about time, for the very reason that the existence of A-properties is not 
essential to the reality of time, one could argue that the C-theory and the D-theory 
are not kinds of anti-realism because the existence of respectively B-relations and C-
relations are not essential to the reality of time. I fully agree. All these claims 
characterize as full-blown anti-realism about time if and only if properties whose 
reality is denied are judged to be essential to time. But, for now, let us focus on the 
reality and unreality of time’s properties in order to come back later to the reality of 
time itself.  
 These properties can both be denied reality, but one cannot choose to deny 
reality to any combination of time’s properties. Some properties are embedded more 
deeply than others in our concept of time, as shown by this table: 
 
 Realism Anti-realism 
Flow (A-properties) A-theory B-theory/C-theory/D-theory 
Directionality (B-relations) B-theory C-theory/D-theory 
Dimensionality (C-relations) C-theory D-theory 
 
 It is quite natural to draw this table when recalling that McTaggart takes B-
relations to result from the transition of A-properties in C-relations. Or, to put it 
differently, time gets its direction (B-relations), from the flow of time (transition of A-
properties) within a dimension (structured by C-relations). Hence, realism about A-
properties implies realism about B-relations and C-relations17. Anti-realism about A-
                                                
15 For a detailed discussion of the view, the 'R-theory', see Oaklander (2013). 
16 Obviously, the B-theory is often taken to be a realist account of time, in 
opposition to McTaggart's view. However, following Mellor (2001), I take this 
classification to be mostly terminological: one can choose to take the B-theory as a 
kind of anti-realism. 
17 Or solely B-relations, if one wants to endorse Russell's view. 
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properties leaves open different options: first, realism about B-relations and C-
relations (the B-theory), second, realism about C-relations and anti-realism about B-
relations (the C-theory), and finally, anti-realism about B-relations and C-relations 
(the D-theory).  
 One could immediately object that these three properties are not enough to 
characterize time. Time is supposed to have other properties, like universality (the 
fact that time’s measured metric is the same for every observer, an idea famously 
undermined by special relativity) and topological properties (for instance, the fact that 
time has a beginning and/or an ending and is linear or cyclical). For topological 
properties, it should be clear that their existence supposes that there is a time 
dimension. Indeed, topological properties specify the 'geometry' of this very 
dimension. Hence, the destiny of topological properties is closely connected to the 
existence of a time dimension (realism about C-relations), and in some cases, 
probably of a directed time dimension (realism about B-relations: for instance, if one 
wants to distinguish between the beginning and the ending of time, one must 
recognize a direction). What about universality? As others, I believe that universality 
has been undermined by special relativity, and that one should be anti-realist about 
this particular alleged property of time. It is also worth noticing that, with the 
important exception of universality18, the fact that these properties can be found in 
the pre-theoretical concept of time is contentious. It is not particularly clear that our 
pre-theoretical concept of time is relationalist or substantivalist about time (granting 
that there is a genuine difference at all between the views—something that, following 
Benovsky19, can be questioned), or, say, that it construes time as having a first 
instant. For these reasons, in what follows, I will focus only on the following the 
properties of time: directionality and dimensionality. I will take the debate between A-
theorists and B-theorists to be classical enough to say no more about it: one can 
accept the existence of a flow, or on the contrary, deny it. In what follows, I will focus 
instead on the newly introduced C-theory and D-theory. Let us focus first on the C-
theory, that is, the combination of realism about C-relations and anti-realism about B-
relations.  
 
4. Time Direction: The C-theory  
 
The idea that the dimension of time is asymmetric, or equivalently, has a direction, is 
quite natural, but leads to a delicate question: what is the source of such a direction? 
We can distinguish between direction primitivism, the view that time is intrinsically 
and primitively directed, and direction reductionism, the view that time takes its 
direction from something else. Two kinds of direction reductionism are well-known. 
For instance, it has been claimed that it is not time itself that is directed, but 
causation. Along this line of thought, temporal relations are not intrinsically directed, 
but only derivatively in that causation is (for instance, this seems to be Mellor's 
position20). Or, to put it differently, temporal relations get their direction from causal 
relations. A second reductionist option is to reduce in one way or another temporal 
direction to a nomological direction (an asymmetry exhibited by laws of nature)21. In 
                                                
18 It seems quite clear that our pre-theoretical concept of time involves 
universality; we all behave like there is one and only one time, i.e., a universal 
measure of processes, allowing people to organize themselves. 
19 Benovsky (2010). 
20 Mellor (2001). 
21 Another option would be to endorse the Aristotelian project of reducing time's 
direction to change's direction. This view is unpopular because defining change 
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both cases (reduction to the direction of causation and reduction to the direction of 
nomological phenomenon), it might be useful, as stressed for instance by Price, to 
distinguish between asymmetry of time and asymmetries in time. It is a fact that 
natural processes have a direction: there are asymmetries in time. To take Price's 
example, buildings may collapse into rubble, but it could not go the other way 
around: rubbles do not 'uncollapse' into buildings22. In what follows, I will take for 
granted that asymmetries in time have something to do with the direction of 
causality. If you disagree and feel more attracted by the idea of rooting time's 
direction in some particular physical process, feel free to pick up your favourite 
source of non-temporal direction when I refer to causation and asymmetries in time. 
 But there is another way to go regarding the connection between asymmetries 
in time and the asymmetry of time. One could take asymmetries in time to derive 
from a particular intrinsic direction of time itself. Direction primitivism about time is 
the view that there is such a particular intrinsic direction of time itself and that no 
further explanation of this fact can be provided. On the contrary, direction 
reductionism about time is the view that there is a particular direction of time itself, 
but one identical to, or supervening on, or grounded in (feel free to pick your 
favourite relation of ontological dependence here) the direction of causation. 
 Finally, it is important to see that one could be attracted by a third position, 
namely direction eliminativism about time. Think about the situation in philosophy of 
mind. One can distinguish between the view that mental properties are identical to, 
are grounded in, or supervene on physical properties (an identity view), and the view 
that there are no mental properties at all, but only physical properties (an eliminativist 
view). In a similar way, according to direction eliminativism, time's direction is not 
real. Or to put it differently, if time is real, then time has no intrinsic direction. Hence, 
direction eliminativism differs from direction reductionism in that it denies that time 
has a direction. It allows, of course, for the possibility of asymmetries in time, for 
instance, by being direction realist about causation: there would be genuine directed 
relations, causal relations, distinct from temporal relations. Actually, presented like 
that, direction eliminativism about time seems to me to be an attractive view: it points 
out that we mistake asymmetries in time for the asymmetry of time.  
 It should be clear that direction eliminativism is another name of the C-theory: 
there are directed relations, but these are not temporal relations. The moral to be 
drawn here is that the C-theory offers us a way to be realist about the time 
dimension while denying reality to a flow and a direction of time. Hence, the 
difference between the B-theory and the C-theory is a very technical one: they only 
differ about the source of asymmetries along the time axis. The B-theory takes 
asymmetries in time to result from the asymmetry of time, while the C-theory takes 
asymmetries in time to originate in the direction of causality. Hence, direction 
eliminativism implies the C-theory and direction primitivism implies the B-theory. 
 What about the classification of direction reductionism? I believe that it 
depends on what a reduction is supposed to be. But in general, a reduction is 
supposed to be conservative: if time's direction is reduced, it means that it is saved, 
not that it is eliminated. In this sense, direction reductionism should count as a 
particular kind of B-theory, and not of C-theory, since it takes time's direction to be 
real. Hence, I take Mellor to be a B-theorist and not a C-theorist. 
 One could ask what would be the advantages of the C-theory. I believe there 
is mainly one reason to be attracted by the view. It comes as a fact that causal and 
                                                                                                                                                  
requires a concept of time, leading to a vicious circle. For a defense of this particular 
kind of direction reductionism, see Bowin (2009). 
22 Price (1997, 17). 
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temporal relations always have the same direction (allow me to put aside possible 
cases of time travels and backward causation). Hence, it seems natural to look for a 
common explanation of these two directions. Obviously, the simplest way to go is to 
say that we make a mistake in taking causal relations to be temporal relations, or on 
the contrary, in taking causal relations to be temporal relations. There would one and 
only one kind of directed relations. Hence, the quest for ontological parsimony 
should lead us to an elimination of either temporal relations or causal relations. The 
C-theory corresponds to the first option. 
 Regarding the second option, it is worth noticing that B-relations are important 
for different explanations of causality. Causal relations are usually explained away 
thanks to temporal relations. For instance, Hume takes causal relations to be 
relations holding between events and satisfying three conditions: regularity, 
contiguity, and anteriority. Or again, according to the conditional counter-factual 
analysis A causes B if and only if it would be true that if A did not occur, B would not 
have occurred either. It can be seen that if one wishes to endorse a Humean position 
about causation, or an analysis in terms of counter-factual statements, she must at 
least go for the B-theory. Hence, the C-theory might prove to be a bad one in that it 
closes the possibility of explaining causation in terms of temporal relations. 
 But, I believe that switching the order of explanation provides us with an 
interesting position, in particular, if one is skeptical about the Humean and the 
counter-factual accounts of causation. If one takes causal relations to be primitive, 
and irreducible to temporal relations, then it is possible to eliminate temporal B-
relations and explain the apparent B-relations as the result of causal processes 
taking place within the C-relations network. 
 Moreover, the C-theory has a strong advantage in that it can fit with Mellor's 
desiderata for a criterion explaining the distinction between space and time, granting 
that we live in a four-dimensional manifold of events. After arguing against 
McTaggart, who took change to be the special feature of time (time would be the 
only dimension of change), Mellor suggests that we take causation instead as the 
special feature of the time dimension (time would be the only dimension in which 
causal relations always have the same direction). 
 Hence, we should choose between two possible notions as the main primitive 
of the explanation, causation or temporal relations. One must go. And, as I tried to 
show, if one chooses not to use the temporal relation as a primitive notion, one can 
be either direction reductionist (as Mellor) or direction eliminativist (in other words, a 
C-theorist). 
 As I said, direction eliminativism seems to me to be a better view than 
direction reductionism because it is not entirely clear what it means that the time 
direction is grounded in (or supervenes on, or is ontologically dependent on) the 
direction of causation. Direction eliminativism allows us to explain directions in the 
world without requiring a relation of ontological dependence), contrary to direction 
reductionism. I take this point to be an advantage of the C-theory, but I do not wish 
to argue further for this point here. It will do to notice that a C-theory is available if 
one if skeptical about the classical B-theory based on direction reductionism (along 
with a B-theory based on direction primitivism). 
 In a nutshell, if one wants to eliminate causal relations in favour of temporal 
relations, one must be a B-theorist, and if one wants to be a C-theorist, one must 
eliminate temporal relations in favour of causal relations. The two strategies seem 
attractive and share the same ontological parsimony. In any case, the C-theory is 
anti-realist about time only if the time dimension is expected to be intrinsically 
directed. Direction eliminativism seems to be a possible way to understand the 
existence of asymmetries in the world. There would only be asymmetries in time, 
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and no asymmetries of time. Time would only be a symmetrical fourth dimension. 
But is the reality of such a fourth space-like dimension enough to grant reality to 
time? 
 Here again we must ask what property time should have to be said to be real. 
How far in the revision of the concept of time can we go before claiming that the 
revision has gone too far for time to be saved? Once again, I will not answer this 
question. On the contrary, I will pursue my enquiry by looking at the last and 
probably deepest property of time: its dimensionality. As we just saw, it seems at 
least conceivable to take time to be real as a dimension, even if lacking an intrinsic 
direction. Now, let us turn to a more radical question. Is it possible to construe time 
as lacking a dimension? And, if not, is it possible to construe the world as lacking a 
time dimension? 
 
5. Time Dimensionality: The D-theory  
 
As I said, knowing if the B-theories and the C-theories are realist or anti-realist 
accounts of time is largely a terminological matter. The situation is different for the D-
theory. Indeed, it is very difficult to understand what it could mean that time is real, if 
there is no such a thing as a time dimension. In a nutshell, if there is no time 
dimension, then there is no time at all. But one might be tempted to claim that only 
the present instant is real and, that in this sense, presentism23, might qualify as a 
kind of realist D-theory. There would be no time dimension, since there is only one 
instant, and one instant is not enough to make a dimension. But it should be clear 
that this move is tricky. Presentism, as it is usually conceived of, does not deny that 
time has a dimension, and that particular events are ordered in a coherent network 
of relations of anteriority and simultaneity. Take a possible world that is correctly 
described by both presentism and an anti-realist account about the flow of time, in 
which there are no temporal relations. In such a world, there is no time dimension, 
since there is only one instant (or no instant, depending on what an instant is 
supposed to be). Now, take a possible world that is correctly described by both the 
A-theory and presentism. It seems that there is something more in this second world, 
which I take it to be, in a minimal sense, a dimension: an organization of events. 
How it could be possible that time has a dimension without being inhabited by events 
is a particular problem the presentist must answer on her own. But independently of 
the answer, the presentist, as I understand her, acknowledges the existence of a 
time dimension. Hence, I fail to see what would be a realist D-theory of time, and I 
suggest taking the D-theory as a genuine kind of anti-realism about time: if there is 
no time dimension, then time is unreal. 
 Being granted that the D-theory is an anti-realist account of time, in any 
possible interpretation (contrary to the C-theory), one might ask if the view might be 
true. I am inclined to say ‘no’. And, by that, I do not want to argue that there is no 
conceptual room for the D-theory and that there is no conceivable world compatible 
with the D-theory. My point is that the D-theory is largely at odds with what we know 
of the actual world24. The view cannot be true of the actual world because there are 
                                                
23 See for instance Bigelow (1996), Bourne (2006), Markosian (2004), Merricks 
(1999) and Zimmerman (1998). 
24 This point is important because metaphysical contingentism, the view that 
some metaphysical statements might be true in a contingent way has recently 
received a lot of attention. See for instance Rosen (2006) and Miller (2009, 2010). If 
contingentism is true, then the D-theory might be true of some possible worlds 
containing time. As implausible as it is, I am not dealing with this idea here; I focus 
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too many things populating the universe. The universe is made of various events 
obtaining at different instants. By denying the reality of a time dimension, one must 
deny the reality of events themselves, as entities existing in a network of temporal 
relations. 
 To make the view more vivid, let us contrast it to related views. It is worth 
noticing that the D-view is incompatible with both relationism and substantivalism 
about time25. Indeed, both views take time to be real, at least in the sense that there 
is a dimension of time. According to substantivalism, time is real and is a special 
substance (different from other substances) containing material substances. Indeed, 
this idea of countenance is one of the two ways to describe the view. The other is the 
modal one: according to substantivalism, time is real and can exist without matter or 
objects within it. The countenance and modal features are obviously related in that 
substances are generally described with an ontological independence criterion: to be 
a substance, an entity has to be ontologically independent from other entities. 
Hence, if time is a substance in this sense (the countenance idea), it implies that 
time can be real without other entities taking place within it (the modal idea). On the 
other hand, according to relationism, time is real and is a collection of relations 
between material entities (say events, objects and/or matter). Hence, time is not a 
substance in the sense of ontological independence (there cannot be time in 
absence of matter), and there cannot be time without entities taking place within it. 
Anyway, in both cases time is a dimension, whatever this dimension is supposed to 
be, a collection of relations ontologically dependent on their relata (as in relationism), 
or an ontologically independent substance (as in substantivalism). Hence, the D-view 
is incompatible with both substantivalism and relationism, by claiming that there is no 
such a thing as a collection of temporal relations or a temporal substance. To put it 
differently, relationism and substantivalism both suppose the existence of a time 
dimension, and only differ about the nature (substance or collection of properties) of 
this dimension. 
 This shows us that the D-theory is a radical view insofar as it denies what is 
usually supposed: that there is a dimension associated with time. But counter-
intuitiveness is not necessarily a good reason to reject a view. I believe we can 
express quite clearly why the D-theory doesn’t sound like a very attractive view. It 
denies that there is organization in the world. It denies that there are relations 
ordering events. Surely, we might believe that time is not flowing, or that time does 
not have an intrinsic direction. But we cannot deny that what happens follows a 
specific order. At best we can believe that this order is not temporal, but we cannot 
describe the world as lacking in order: Descartes lived between Plato and Kant. It is 
a fact. This 'between' might be atemporal, if the historical dimension is not an 
intrinsically ordered dimension as in the C-theory, but the D-theory tells us that there 
is no dimension at all. Hence, in what follows I will take the reality of such a time 
dimension as a fact: there is no room for the D-theory (at least in the sense that it 
cannot be true of the actual world). The most anti-realist view about time must 
concede the existence of a fourth dimension. 
 Hence, there are two ways to understand the D-theory. Either it is a theory 
about time, or one about the actual world. According to this distinction, the moderate 
D-theorist claims that there is no temporal dimension, what there is instead is an 
atemporal dimension. According to a more radical D-theorist, there is no temporal 
dimension, and no fourth atemporal dimension to be found in the world. As I said 
                                                                                                                                                  
instead on the temporal ontology of the actual world. 
25 For a presentation and discussion of the views, see for instance Benovsky 
(2010). 
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above, it is dubious that there is not a fourth dimension. Hence, the radical D-theory 
does not seem to be of interest when focusing on the ontology of the actual world. 
The moderate D-theory is more interesting in that it does not deny the reality of a 
fourth dimension, but describes it as being something atemporal.  
 Next, I examine two of the more famous anti-realist views about time in order 
to see which feature of time they reject. I will focus on Julian Barbour's and Carlo 
Rovelli's views.  
 
6. Barbour's Time Capsules 
 
Barbour’s account of the unreality of time is a work-in-progress theory not empirically 
confirmed. My understanding of the view relies mainly on the reading offered by 
Butterfield26 and Healey27. Barbour uses two important concepts: Nows and time-
capsules. Let us introduce the first concept. Barbour's picture of the world is a kind of 
modal realism, according to which possible worlds (Nows) are as real as the actual 
one. It differs from David Lewis' original modal realism28 on three important aspects. 
First, these worlds are not temporally extended. They are instantaneous states, as 
suggested by the name 'Nows'. These Nows are spatially extended, but not 
temporally. Or more precisely because time is quantized, these states are not really 
instantaneous; they have a temporal extension, but a very small one. Secondly, 
possible worlds are understood as physically possible worlds here. In other words, a 
possible world is one instantiating the very same laws of nature as the ones holding 
in the actual world. In this sense, the set of physically possible worlds does not 
include worlds in which different laws of nature obtain. Third, this picture is realist 
about space, but not about spacetime. A world is a space, not a spacetime. In Lewis' 
view, a world is identified to a spacetime, not a space. Space at a particular time is 
just a temporal proper part of a spacetime. Spacetime comes first as a primitive 
entity, space then as a derivative one. But in Barbour's view, there is no spacetime at 
all, just a set of spaces (Nows) co-existing together. 
 To understand the second notion of time-capsules, it might be useful to quote 
Healey: 
 
To get an idea of what a Now is supposed to be, one is supposed to think initially 
in temporal terms. In those terms, a Now corresponds to an instantaneous relative 
configuration of the universe. But of course, Nows are neither instants nor 
contained in any independently existing time; they just exist atemporally. Most 
Nows are not time-capsules. But amongst the vast number of Nows are a few 
whose internal structure contains a representation of an entire sequences of other 
Nows -a sequence that, when appropriately ordered in accordance with the 
internal properties of each represented Now, comes to represent what looks like a 
possible history. These are the time-capsules. Barbour's central idea is that 
                                                
26 Butterfield (2002). 
27 Healey (2002). 
28 Lewis (1986). 
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experiencing such a time-capsule gives rise to the (misleading) belief that it does 
indeed represent the sequence of events that have actually occurred, so that the 
'history' apparently represented in the time-capsule in fact occurred as a unique 
sequence of events in time29. 
 
 
 One can see that time-capsules are specific Nows, having a particular feature: 
they contain a representation of a sequence (a linear ordering) of other Nows. Why 
is such an account anti-realist about time? The answer is that linear order comes 
under attack: time ordering is simply blown up. There are no worlds made of events, 
no histories of worlds, just a 'space' of worlds, that is, a modal space of worlds, with 
a probabilist function encoding the probability to jump from a possible world to 
another possible world (even if there is no jump). This view is the most radical anti-
realist view about time in the sense that it even denies the existence of a time 
dimension. In this model, we are left with three spatial dimensions and modal 
dimensions. It seems interesting to me that, in order to eliminate the time dimension, 
modal ones must be postulated instead. 
 Now, in general, when one claims that something is unreal because there is 
something else instead, one could immediately ask where the difference really lies 
between a revisionary account and an anti-realist one. Is there really a big difference 
in saying that time is not real and that what there is instead is a modal space, that is, 
a collection of modal dimensions (anti-realism about time dimension), and saying 
that time is real but merely as a kind of multi-dimensional space? Of course, this 
modal space is very different from the classical time dimension: in particular, such a 
'modal space' is not linear. These dimensions differ greatly from McTaggart's fourth 
dimension, made of C-series, that was supposed to be linear. Here again, I believe 
that the choice of calling the view ‘realist’ or ‘anti-realist’ about time is merely 
terminological. What really matters is how many dimensions there are above the 
three spatial ones. There is no ontological point in trying to decide if these 
'supplementary dimensions' qualify as time or not30. Moreover, I am not at all sure 
that we have something in our pre-theoretical concepts about time and modality that 
offers us a way to make this terminological choice. 
 In one interpretation, Barbour's view qualifies then as a moderate D-theory 
(there is no time dimension), in the other it is a C-theory. Or more cautiously, it is the 
view that there are more than three space-like dimensions structuring reality. So, 
strictly speaking, what is called the time dimension would in fact be two or more 
space-like dimensions. Hence, the view is difficult to see as a C-theory, because it 
only saves dimensionality by letting go of linear order. Hence, it shows that there is a 
new, very revisionary, way to be realist about time, an account in which time is real, 
by being two or more dimensions, and by being non-linear. Barbour's view is then a 
C-theory if one defines it as a realism about further temporal dimension(s), but is not 
if one defines it as a realism about C-relations (taken to be linear relations). Once 
again, this is a terminological matter: what is expected of the fourth (and more) 
dimension(s) to count as time? They describe a world of at least four dimensions, 
                                                
29 Healey (2002, 309). 
30 Unless one believes there are essences in the world, and in particular an 
essence of time. If so, I am wrong to take this question as a terminological one: there 
is a substantive matter over the essential properties of time. However, I fail to see a 
good reason to believe in time's essence, granting that the notion of time refers to 
very different properties in different contexts. 
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and only differ with respect to the choice of referring to the supplementary 
dimension(s) (above space) as time or not. Let us turn now to Rovelli's anti-realism. 
 
7. Rovelli's Anti-realism 
 
Rovelli says there are two ways to understand Einstein’s idea that spacetime is 
identical to the gravitational field: one of the two is real when the other one is not. I 
believe this is a misleading way to explain what is going on. Before explaining, let us 
quote Rovelli: 
 
Einstein's discovery is that newtonian spacetime and the gravitational field are the 
same entity. This can be expressed in two equivalent ways. One states that there 
is no space-time; there is only the gravitational field. This is the choice I have 
made in this book. The second states that there is no gravitational field: it is 
spacetime that has dynamical properties. This choice is common in the literature. I 
prefer the first because I find that the difference between the two points of view is 
only a matter of choice of words, and thus, ultimately, personal taste. If one 
prefers to keep the name "spacetime" for the gravitational field, then one can still 
hold a substantivalist position and claim that, according to [General Relativity], 
spacetime is an entity, not a relation. Furthermore, localization can be defined with 
respect to the gravitational field, and therefore the substantivalist can say that 
spacetime is an entity that defines localization31. 
 
 It seems to me that it is strictly speaking false that one can choose to believe 
that the gravitational field is real, or on the contrary, that spacetime is real. We 
cannot have A=B, with A and B having different existential statuses. This would be a 
confusion between an identity theory and an eliminativist one. Hence, one must 
choose: either one of the two entities is unreal or they are identical and both real. But 
here, I believe it is important to notice that a field has dimensionality in the same way 
space has. A field is nothing else than a distribution of properties in a space. So I do 
not understand Rovelli's claim that spacetime is not real, and that what there is 
instead is the gravitational field. The gravitational field conceptually involves the 
existence of a space, and by this fact, is a richer notion. 
 Anyway, the two approaches described by Rovelli are realist about 
dimensionality, the dimensionality of a field, or the dimensionality of a space. This is 
just a matter of words. What is denied when Rovelli claims that there is no spacetime 
is that there is no spacetime above the gravitational field. But this gravitational field 
has degrees of freedom, that is, dimensionality. So this is a space: Rovelli’s 
interpretation is one in which the physical world is a distribution of properties in 
spacetime, or a distribution of properties structured by relations of ordering in 
dimensions. The idea here is that relations of ordering are necessary to structure the 
field. Hence, once again, classifying the view as realist about spacetime is mostly a 
terminological matter. 
                                                
31 Rovelli (2004, 77). 
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 Now, should we construe Rovelli's view as a kind of D-theory or C-theory? Is 
there a time dimension in his account? Clearly, Rovelli is not denying reality to a 
four-dimensional manifold, but choosing not calling it spacetime. Hence, his view can 
qualify as a moderate D-theory of time. If time (spacetime) is not real, this is because 
there is instead a dimension (four dimensions) of the gravitational field. But the view 
can be classified as a C-theory too. Indeed, Rovelli agrees that this is a 
terminological choice. One must decide if one takes the fourth dimension as a 
temporal dimension (and the three other dimensions as spatial dimensions). Hence, 
we are free to choose to characterize the view as a C-theory or a moderate D-theory. 
It merely depends on what we expect time to be. If time is minimally supposed to be 
a fourth dimension, then this is a realist C-theory. If not, this is a moderate D-theory. 
In any case, in this account, the world is structured by four dimensions, all of them 
exhibiting linear order. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
It is very difficult to deny the existence of time or spacetime in the sense of 
dimensionality. The physical world has at least four dimensions. Even in Barbour's 
view, in which there is not a fourth linear dimension, there is a modal space instead. 
What could be more easily denied is that time flows, that there is a fourth linear 
dimension and that there is a direction embedded in the fourth dimension. If so, the 
direction would have to be either an illusion or embedded in the entities inhabiting 
the time dimension, that is, dispositional properties, causal relations, processes or 
whatever basic entities one accepts in its ontology above dimensions. In any case, I 
hope I have convinced you that we should be realists about time in the sense of the 
four-dimensionalist: the world is necessarily structured by (at least) a fourth 
dimension. 
 Now, there is a separate question I have so far refused to answer: what is 
required for time to be real? Surely, we are free to endorse a revisionary conception 
of time. After all, the classical B-theory belongs to revisionary views about time by 
denying that time flows as is usually supposed. And, the B-theory can be construed 
as a kind of anti-realism if one follows McTaggart's claim that A-properties are 
essential to time. Hence, the anti-realist B-theory is ontologically equivalent to the 
realist B-theory, and the distinction between the two is merely an affair of semantics. 
It goes the same way for the C-theory, a view that can also be construed as a 
particular kind of realist revisionary conception of time. One can decide that a new 
concept of time, resulting from the relocation of direction from time itself to causation, 
is too different from the older pre-theoretical concept of time, and acknowledge this 
difference by claiming that our pre-theoretical concept of time does not refer. Or, on 
the contrary, one could claim that a time that lacks both flow and direction is still real 
by its dimensionality, by being the fourth dimension of the universe. Again, I take the 
choice between the realist C-theory and the anti-realist C-theory to be a 
terminological matter. Anyway, we cannot decently deny that there is at least one 
dimension corresponding to what we call the dimension of time.  
 The D-theory eschews this particular terminological problem: if there is no 
time dimension, then there is no time at all. There is no point in asking if time can be 
real without a time dimension. Still, the D-theory is interesting because it can 
characterize Barbour's view, and indeed, Barbour's view can count as a genuine sort 
of full-blown anti-realism about time. But, in Barbour's view, there is a fourth 
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dimension, or more precisely, there are more than three dimensions. The choice of 
considering the dimensions constitutive of the modal space as different from the time 
dimension is partly terminological. Here again, one can construe the considered 
proposal as being realist about time by identifying time to the modal space. Hence, 
the moderate D-theory is ontologically equivalent to a particular C-theory (temporal 
realism about further dimension(s) with no unique linear fourth dimension). 
 All of this shows that there are very different anti-realist accounts of the 
unreality of time. But how are we going to choose between all the candidates which 
are the necessary properties of time? What are the conditions of existence of time? 
Since it had never been clear what time is supposed to be, it is simply impossible to 
say that time is real or not by satisfying or failing to satisfy a particular condition. At 
the end of this enquiry, we should have no doubt that we are living in a world having 
at least four dimensions, but we can doubt almost any other property that time is 
supposed to have. Hence, I hope to have made clear that the possible substantive 
questions about time are about the existence or not of a flow, and the source(s) of 
asymmetries in, and/or of the fourth dimension(s). There is no point trying to 
demonstrate the reality or unreality of time simpliciter, since this is a far too complex 
notion. 
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